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IN QUEST OF GENERAL PERSHING 
G EORGE SANTAYANA once observed that "an attempt to rehearse the inner life of everybody that has ever 
lived would be no rational endeavor," and obviously he is 
right. Biographers, "picklocks" in Stephen Benkt's phrase, 
consequently are forced to some standard of judgment in 
choosing a subject. Often this standard is hard to see, harder 
to understand, but presumably it exists. The standard is 
made up of multiple considerations. Market, for one: Will 
the subject make into a salable package? Crass? Yes, but 
compensation is a vital concern to scholars, even though their 
persistent penury appears to belie it! Availability of sources 
is another consideration: Is the subject sufficiently impor- 
tant to have attracted public attention and hence won notice 
in the press and the salon? These questions lead to an ob- 
vious consideration: Is the subject worth all the trouble he 
will surely cause the prospective picklock biographer? 
There are other considerations. One that may directly af- 
fect most biographers is a matter of opinion: What does the 
biographer think of his subject? Does he like his man; does 
he loathe him? I think a writer must come to feel strongly 
one way or the other-a pallid neutrality toward a subject 
can hardly lead to lasting zeal in research and inquiry, If 
he likes his man, can a blend of sympathy and understanding 
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be achieved without crossing the line into hero worship? If 
he actively dislikes his man, can he yet study him with de- 
tachment, balance merit and maIevoIence? 
Once a subject is selected, the biographer is ready to be- 
gin "living with his man, possibly for years. Usually this 
process involves a large degree of identification-the student 
comes to share the pride and prejudice of his hero, comes to 
like his friends and fight his foes. This is a good thing, if kept 
in bounds-but when the biographer finds that he takes as 
a persona1 insult any slur on his man, then he has identified 
too successfully. The result of such alter egoism can be pas- 
sionate prose, but is usually poor history. 
How, then, can the scholar walk a conscience line between 
fact and fiction, reality and romance? There is, I fear, no 
hard and fast rule, no easy panacea. Re must always keep 
an eye toward creeping panegyric, but not to the point of 
losing the art of biography-for biography is most of all a 
literary art. It is, too, an integral part of history, hence is also 
a muse and subject to Olympian whimsies and deceits. The 
best guard against excess bias is broad research, careful 
analysis, and honest writing. 
Nothing is more fascinating nor more frustrating than an 
attempt to understand people. When people are historical, 
wrapped in the myths of time, fascination and frustration are 
irritatingly magnified. And that surely is one reason why 
there are so many biographers-the challenge of the medium 
is constant. It is certainly one of the reasons why I persist in 
the field. And for myself there is a consideration I have not 
yet mentioned-one which I hope has pushed others into the 
genre: a kind of escapism, a desire to share, even vicariously, 
the doing of large deeds. 
Any history graduate student who can recite his method- 
ology catechism will tell you that the subject selected indi- 
cates a great deal about the biographer. I devoutly hope 
this isn't true-since I am invariably intrigued by generals 
everyone else regards as dull, unbearable, or crazy! 
John J. Pershing was neither dull nor crazy: he seems 
often to have been unbearable. But he intrigues me. Why? 
I hesitate to offer the obvious answer. Some legitimate rea- 
sons are that he had much to do with winning the First 
World War, that he molded a modern American anny, that 
he had great force and fortitude and held that army together 
despite Allied pressure to break it up and feed it to the Ger- 
mans piecemeal. Surely these achievements suffice for in- 
terest in a man? Yes, but there is much more to Pershing than 
his cold efficiency. Behind his chilly eyes and sculptured face 
lurks a personality I would like to know. 
The usual biographical data is easy enough to come by, 
for few men in the twentieth century have had so much writ- 
ten about them in the public prints. Born, near Laclede, Mis- 
souri, September 13, 1860; was graduated from the U, S. 
Military Academy, July 1, 1886; LL.B., University of Neb- 
raska, 1893; active cavalry duty against the Apache, Sioux, 
and Cree; professor of military science and tactics, Univer- 
sity of Nebraska; instructor in tactics, U. S. Military Acade- 
my, to May 5, 1898, when tsansferred at own request to ac- 
tive duty in Cuba; participated in pacification of Philip- 
pines; served as official General Staff observer in Russo- 
Japanese War, 1904-05; promoted over 800 senior officers 
from captain to brigadier general, 1906, by President Theo- 
dore Roosevelt; led the Punitive Expedition against Pancho 
Villa, 1916-17; was selected to lead U. S. Expeditionary 
Force in Europe, and commanded it, 1917-18; promoted to 
chief of staff, U. S. Amy, 1921-24; served on Battle Monu- 
ments Commission after the war, and on various other gov- 
ernment commissio~~s; died at Walter Reed Hospital, Wash- 
ington, D. C., July 15, 1948. 
Such biographical details are the framework of a man's 
life-the bare bones on which to build him from the records. 
How can these stark facts evoke Pershing's personality, his 
character? They cannot, of course, but they do serve as 
guides to collecting the sort of data which possibly will 
lend understanding. 
Miltitary biography is a combination of understanding, re- 
search, interpretation, and background. A soldier must be 
understood in his time, discovered in the records of con- 
temporaries, interpreted by contemporary standards, and 
portrayed on as large a scale as possible. Hopefully, then, 
incidents blend into experiences, experiences into traits, traits 
into characteristics, characteristics into personality. Every- 
thing is important in the molding of a soldier, especially 
things in his youth and education. Too often military bio- 
graphies ignore the early years and leap into a general's cam- 
paigns without adequate explanation of how and why the 
general acted as he did. 
In Pershing's case, to ignore West Point, to minimize his 
long cavalry service in the West in varied Indian campaigns 
would leave unexplained his fism grasp of the whole struc- 
ture of the U. S. Army and his identification with lasting 
tradition and accepted tactics. Failure to consider these early 
wars against the red men would make Pershing's success 
against the Philippine Moros less intelligible-for, although 
the Moro campaigns were waged in different terrain than the 
Great Plains, the techniques of little unit actions were much 
the same. Early combat experience stood Pershing in good 
stead. 
So, too, his experience as commander of Mindanao, and 
later as governor of the island. Full charge of a geographical 
department gave him a grasp of large-scale army administra- 
tion which would make easier his command in Mexico against 
Villa, and in France against Lloyd George, Georges Clemen- 
ceau, Marshal Foch, and the Germans. 
When Pershing led his 15,000 men into Mexico against 
Pancho Villa in March, 1916, he opened a new phase of U.S. 
military history. Much about this force resembled the old 
asmy-lots of cavalry went along, and it was well suited to 
the vast, arid wastes of northemn Chihuahua. Strong infantry 
columns went too, for current doctrine proclaimed that no 
ground could be properly held without the "queen of bat- 
tles." Field artillery units were counted among Pershing's 
contingents, since artillery shared the spotlight with infantry 
as a combat requisite. But several new ingredients were 
added. 
The U.S. Army, always slow to incorporate novel inven- 
tions (or ideas), looked long and hard at the modern ma- 
chine gun after its introduction around 1890. Dubious about 
the practicality of the new weapon, the Ordnance Depart- 
ment nonetheless felt the Punitive Expedition gave a chance 
to test it under field conditions-and the machine guns which 
accompanied Pershing were among the first (except Gatling 
guns) ever tried in combat by the army. In addition, the 
Signal Corps dispatched a field radio unit to test the prac- 
ticality of rapid communications. A motorized company 
brought trucks to Mexico to supplement the familiar army 
wagon and usher in entirely new logistics. 
Most dramatic of all the innovations, though, was the aero- 
plane-the eight JN-4's of the First Aero Squadron, under 
command of Captain Benjamin Foulois. 
Many participants in the Punitive operations look back on 
them with amused nostalgia-the whole thing has taken on 
a comic opera hue in retrospect, Almost nothing worked ac- 
cording to plans, including the plans, 
Villa, the wraith of the desert, vanished into the vastness 
of north Mexico, struck at widely scattered points, nipped 
at Yankee outposts, and always broke his force into small 
units which rode off ill myriad directions. A sort of Robin 
Hood myth cloaked Villa's brigandage; his men were wel- 
comed in each hamlet and hovel-and the despised gringos 
gained no admittance anywhere. 
Pershing had to probe deep into Mexico to find Villa, and 
extended his lines as he went until the communications net- 
work stretched some 100 miles from Colonia, Dublan, Chi- 
huahua, to Columbus, New Mexico. The trucks did fairly 
well, but finally ran short of fuel and repair parts and when 
that happened, the antique army wagons toiled past them 
day after day-producing some highly original cussing on 
the part of the truck drivers! Beyond Colonia, communica- 
tions became even more difficult; hence Pershing set up his 
advance base here and pushed further into the interior with 
cavalry columns. 
The military situation, quite apart from the logistical one, 
proved a strategist's nightmare. Orders from the War De- 
partment-really from President Wilson himself-restricted 
Pershing's movements to north-south roads, denied him the 
railroads (he used them surreptitiously), and allowed en- 
trance into towns only with the pelmission of local officials. 
Presumably the government of President Carranza cherished 
a whimsical friendship for the U.S., and Carranzista officials 
were counted on to afford aid and comfort. In practice, Car- 
ranza's followers, sharing their leader's feelings, resented 
Yankee intsusion into Mexican affairs and often hindered 
as much as diplomacy would permit. Things degenerated 
by late 1916 and early 1917 to the point of Carranzistas and 
Villistas both firing on Pershing's men. On several occasions, 
notably in the actions of Carrizal and Parral, Carranzistas 
proved more formidable antagonists than Villa's veterans. 
At Carrizal, Pershing's cavalry encountered Mexican troops 
guarding the approaches to the town. The troopers sought 
and were denied permission to enter the village, whereupon 
they dismounted, deployed, and charged a line of Mexican 
infantry. Two machine guns, hidden along a creek bank, cut 
the Yanks to bits, and ought to have taught a lesson regasd- 
ing machine guns and massed infantry. But no one learned 
the lesson, save perhaps the Mexicans. Yershing certainly 
did not-at the moment. 
Carranza's reluctant assistailce disrupted Pershing's plans, 
and convinced him and his superiors that full-scale war with 
Mexico could hardly be avoided-but he tried. Enforcing iron 
discipline, he held his men to assigned scouts, to limited com- 
bat and efficient hazing of Villa's scattered bands. At Ojos 
Azules, the U. S. Cavalry at last hit a large segment of Villa's 
force, broke it into bits, and pe~manently curtailed the bandit 
leader's strength. Months were yet to pass ere the Yankees 
quit Mexico, but Villa's vengeance never came, and pacifi- 
cation was achieved-even as in Mindanao. 
Traditional weapons had done this job. The machine 
guns? They never had anything to shoot at, save jack rabbits 
and cactus. The planes did perform valuable service-accord- 
ing to Benjamin Foulois, now a retired major general in the 
USAF. Their most notable contribution saved the expedi- 
tion's Medical Department from disaster. No, planes were 
not used to fly out the wounded or fly in vaccine or anything 
that prosaic: their engines were drained of castor oil when 
the doctor's supply ran out, and hence an old almy medical 
tradition went unbroken! The radio? Very effective, extseme- 
ly useful-at about twenty miles. Beyond that distance mes- 
sages were sent by plane, by telegraph, or by mounted 
courier, 
If success stood as the test of utility of new weapons, all 
these novel inventions could well be scrapped. And there 
were military men who drew that happy conclusion from 
the Mexican venture. Not Pershing. If everything had not 
worked well, he recognized that this was largely clue to the 
curious nature of the campaign, and that the potential of 
rapid-fire guns, of radios and planes had been amply demon- 
strated. And he learned a great deal about how to work all 
these new tools into the traditional arms of the service, how 
to make them serve as part of the military machine. His dedi- 
cation to them would come clear in France. 
More than his appreciation of things modern, Pershing 
took useful lessons in tactics wit11 him out of Mexico. At West 
Point he had been constantly exposed to stock ideas of the 
virtue of finding the enemy, fixing him in position, fooling 
him, and fighting him-always carry the war to the enemy. 
Attack! Attack with the infantry-sweep the field with the 
bayonet! This archaism lingers yet in military doctrine, de- 
spite impressive statistics to show that few, if any, battles have 
been decided by a bayonet charge. But the essential ingredi- 
ent of the attack is mobility, and this remaills a vital factor 
in war. Pershing's appreciation of mobility had been growing 
steadily as he fought the elusive plains Indians, the nimble 
Moros, and Villa's superb light cavalry. Mobility would prove 
the keystone of his plans for American participation in the 
European War. 
That he was selected to lead the American Expeditionary 
Force in France could hardly have sui-prised many people. 
No other U.S. commander could boast equal experience in 
all types of combat leadership or equal familiarity with mod- 
ern weapons and logistics. No other commander had a father- 
in-law serving on the Senate Military Affairs Committee. 
And-perhaps a vital consideration-no other commander 
looked so typically a modern major general. 
Wilson selected Pershing, gave him disect orders to hold 
the American forces together ( a  point Penhing never men- 
tioned-he took all the blame for this unpopular stand), and 
the President promised to sustain him with a11 Executive 
power. 
When Pershing and a thirty-man staff arrived in France 
in June, 1917, the Allied situation looked poor indeed. Hun- 
dreds of divisions of British, French, and satellite troops 
were mired in 400 miles of trenches-a system of ditches 
which stretched like a scar from Switzerland to the English 
Channel-an angry scar festering barbed wire and blood. 
War had sharply changed from a thing of swift movement 
to a stalemate. Gargantuan armies looked at one another 
across bits of pocked, gas-steeped, seething No Man's Land; 
here and there one of them would heave out of the Augean 
mud, rush across some shell-torn reach of Hell into the dead- 
ly chatter of machine guns, gain at best a useless yard, and 
lapse exhausted into the awful ooze. Time and again the 
leading Allied military "brains" huded their legions into this 
maw of machine guns-so often that death lost its hallow. 
Millions, literally millions, of men lay smashed along the 
Western Front. So many were dead by mid-1917 that a 
mutiny broke out the French army, a mutiny against the 
ossified idiocy of generals who conjured such slaughter. 
Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Allied commander in France, 
counted the cost of the war, totaled the casualties, eyed the 
remaining reserves, and announced early in 1917 that the 
Allies could not last another year without great assistance 
from America. German estimates of the western situation 
coincided with Foch's, and lured Field Marshal Erich Luden- 
dorff to plan victory in 1918-before American help could 
arrive in decisive force. 
During the remainder of 1917 Pershing fought with the 
Supreme Allied War Council to retain autonomy of Ameri- 
can troops-he could not, by Wilson's order, permit distri- 
bution of U.S. units throughout the wasted Allied divisions. 
He wanted, and finally got, permission to create a separate 
U.S. army with its own sector of responsibility and its own 
command. Beyond men and a few hundred machine guns, 
Pershing could, for some time, bring little else to France. 
Artillery and ammunition, planes, and all kinds of transport 
had to come from hard-pressed French and British depots. 
But vindication came in the spring and sunlmer of 1918 dur- 
ing Ludendorff's great Marne offensive. At Cantigny, Belleau 
Wood, and Chateau Thierry, American troops, under their 
own leaders, using Pershing's cherished tactics of mobility, 
proved superior to German crack divisions and earned their 
place in the war. In September the Americans attacked the 
venerable St. Mihiel salient, broke it, and then shifted to join 
in Foch's crusher offensive in the Meuse-Argonne-the last 
big push of the war. When all of it ended on November 11, 
1918, the American Army could justly claim a decisive role 
in the final victory. 
Pershing reaped the laurels of a Great Captain. He repre- 
sented the New Look in generals-although well blooded in 
combat, he had rarely visited the French front. Back of the 
lines, at the desk and the council table, on the telephone and 
the transatlantic wire, he had won his war. War had become 
so large an enterprise that high command now required ad- 
ministrative, executive, and business talent as well as prac- 
tical diplomacy. Pershing served as a business executive, 
presided over the largest enterprise ever sustained by the 
United States, and coordinated the baffling facets of a gi- 
gantic war effort. And with victory, he ranked not only as 
an American hero, but also as a world figure. And so he was 
till he died. 
Countless foreign decorations were given him, Congress 
named him General of the Armies in 1919 ( a  rank previously 
held by one other American, George Washington), he served 
as Chief of Staff of the Army and worked to modenlize it 
in the 1920's. Such eminence made him a natural for various 
international commissions, and in the 20's aizd 30's he tried 
his hand at peacemaking. 
With the coming of the Second World War, General 
George C. Marshall, Pershing's old aide and staff officer, 
sought his advice in frequent consultations, and Pershing 
seems to have had an active role in war planning. 
When he died in 1948, all Americans were conscious that 
a great figure had gone from the scene. But what did they 
<' know of him? Only that, like Lee, he was a marble man," 
who defied approaclz or understanding, who remained the 
portrait of a soldier, ramrod straight, grim-faced, immacu- 
late. Stories circulated briefly about him, and most indicated 
that he barely missed being a martinet-or worse-that he 
was successful, but that he could hardly be called a true 
soldier. Like Grant before him, he had organized victory, 
but had not fought for it. And above all, he came to legend 
a forlnidable man, one beyond liking. 
He was all the things legend makes him. But the r6sum6 
of his career shows him much deeper and more experienced 
than the surface image. 
Since he lived so long, many survive who knew him, and 
this appears to make possible a much more accurate recon- 
struction than would be the case with a figure of the remote 
past. Surely all that need be done is interview many of his 
acquaintances, correlate their impressions, and the "real" 
Pershing will emerge. He won't. With only limited experi- 
ence, as yet, in the new dimension of oral history, I can al- 
ready attest to the various veracity of eyewitnesses. Most of 
the people surviving who served under Pershing were sub- 
ordinate to him-and a subordinate sees only the sternest 
face of his general. Almost all of these witnesses recall a cold, 
hard, book-type soldier, one to be admired but not loved. 
Those who served with him in the Punitive Expedition- 
General Benjamin Foulois, General Courtney Hodges, Gen- 
eral William Simpson-all noted his aloofness in Mexico and 
put it down at the time to certain defects in his ancestry. 
Here is where background data helps, where research into 
written history is essential. Married in 1905 to Frances War- 
ren, daughter of Senator Francis Warren of Wyoming, Per- 
shing thrived on a happy home life and on his three daughters 
and son until 1915. In August, 1915, a fire razed part of the 
San Francisco Presidio and killed Frances and the three 
girls. Not long later, the bereaved husband and father led 
the expedition against Villa. If he remained aloof, seemed 
grim and unbending, is it surprising? 
But beyond the light which the written record will shed- 
including Pershing's own two-volume account of My Experi- 
ences in the World Ww. (which won the Pulitzer Prize in 
1932), his voluminous papers in the Library of Congress and 
in the possession of his son Warren in New York-beyond the 
written record, much more will have to come from surviving 
friends and acquaintances. I wish I could claim a scientific 
system of locating these people, but I can't. Lists of former 
military associates have been checked for survivors-and these 
led to the men I have mentioned. News accounts of General 
Emilio Aguinaldo's health led me to work for an interview 
with him in the Philippines-and I hope I get there in time. 
And luck, plain simple luck-the historian's greatest asset!- 
has led me to an obscure and vital collection of papers in 
Arizona relating to the Punitive Expedition, and to tapes of 
an interview with Miss May Pershing, the General's sister, 
in which she talks much about her brother's love life. 
Years of interviewing, reading, piecing, and sorting remain. 
And perhaps, after it's all done, Pershing will still stand a 
cold block of marble, aloof and unfriendly. But I don't think 
so. I'm convinced that I would have liked him, given the 
chance. I'm looking for the Pershing behind the starched 
tunic, the man Mrs. William Simpson talks about when she 
says that he could enter a room full of men and suddenly 
be the only man any woman would see. Many who met him 
remarked him handsome and cold-but some found him ex- 
citing, magnetic, enticing. What was he really like? 
